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MICHAEL BISHOP
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THE NETWORK THEORY OF WELL-BEING:
AN INTRODUCTION
ABSTRACT: In this paper, I propose a novel approach to inves-
tigating the nature of well-being and a new theory about well-
being. The approach is integrative and naturalistic. It holds that
a theory of well-being should account for two different classes
of evidence—our commonsense judgments about well-being and
the science of well-being (i.e., positive psychology). The network
theory holds that a person is in the state of well-being if she in-
stantiates a homeostatically clustered network of feelings, emo-
tions, attitudes, behaviors, traits, and interactions with the world
that tends to have a relatively high number of states that feel
good, that lead to states that feel good, or that are valued by the
agent or her culture.
Change your life and you might make it better or you might make it
worse. A change that makes your life go better for you promotes your
well-being; a change that makes your life go worse for you diminishes
your well-being. This is intuitive enough. But what is well-being? A
good way to begin to think about it is with an exercise. How would you
explain that a person has a high degree of well-being without actually
using the word ‘well-being’ or its synonyms? If you aren’t already cor-
rupted by a philosophical theory, you might offer a thumbnail sketch
something like this: “Felicity is in a happy and fulfilling committed
relationship, she has close and caring friends, she keeps fit by playing
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racquetball, a sport she enjoys, and her professional life is both success-
ful and satisfying.” Most people’s theoretically innocent description of
someone with a high degree of well-being will include both “objective”
facts about the person (e.g., facts about her relationships, her activi-
ties, her professional life) as well as “subjective” facts about the per-
son (e.g., facts about her commitments to and her feelings about kith
and kin, facts about her finding certain activities enjoyable and satisfy-
ing). The objective and subjective facts we appeal to when explaining
Felicity’s—or anyone’s—degree of well-being include:
1. positive feelings, moods, emotions (e.g., joy, contentment),
2. positive attitudes (e.g., optimism, hope, openness to new experi-
ences),
3. positive traits (e.g., friendliness, curiosity, perseverance), and
4. successful interactions with the world (e.g., strong relationships,
professional accomplishment, fulfilling hobbies or projects).
So far, so good. But how does this ramshackle set of facts fit into a
coherent whole? How are we supposed to unite these various objective
and subjective facts into a coherent theory of well-being? The answer I
propose is simple: We don’t have to. The world has already joined them
together with causal bonds. Think of the above elements of someone’s
well-being as nodes in a complex causal network or web. Every node
in that network is causally connected to some of the other nodes—
it fosters some, and is fostered by others. I call these positive causal
networks.
The idea behind positive causal networks is that the features of
someone’s life we appeal to in explaining her well-being - her commit-
ted relationship, friendships, exercise regimens, professional successes,
her confidence and sense of mastery, her joie de vivre, friendliness,
moxie and adventurousness, her curiosity, hope and optimism—are not
an accidental conglomeration of happy facts. A person’s well-being has
a causal structure—its components are causally bound together. For
example, pick out any “happy fact” that is a component of Felicity’s
well-being, say, her professional success. This success is fostered by
many other factors we appeal to in describing Felicity’s well-being—
her curiosity, moxie, optimism, and confidence, her exercise regimen,
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Figure 1: Professional Success as a Node in a Positive Causal Network
her social support. But Felicity’s professional success is also a cause of
some of those “happy facts.” Her professional success bolsters her in-
come, her optimism, her confidence and the strength of at least some of
her relationships. So Felicity’s professional success is a node in a posi-
tive causal network. What is true about Felicity’s professional success is
also true of many of the components of her well-being. Each is a node
in a causal network of some combination of positive feelings, positive
attitudes, positive traits or successful interactions with the world.
Notice that some states are both cause and effect of Felicity’s pro-
fessional success (her optimism, confidence, and social support). What
this suggests is that Felicity’s well-being consists of some positive cycli-
cal processes. Felicity’s professional success leads her to acquire, main-
tain or strengthen other positive features of her person; and in turn
these positive features help foster her professional success; and so
on. These sorts of positive cycles are plausibly associated with many
other components of people’s well-being. For example, Felicity’s opti-
mism helps her overcome challenges and makes her more successful
socially and professionally, and having success tends to bolster Felic-
ity’s optimism (Seligman 1990). Felicity’s friendships and committed
relationship provide her with various kinds of material and psycho-
logical support, which help to make Felicity more trusting, more ex-
traverted, and more generous, and these traits in turn make Felicity
a better friend and partner, which tend to strengthen her friendships
and relationship (Fredrickson 2001). Felicity’s exercise regimen gives
her more strength, energy and positive emotions, which help her, in
various ways, to continue her exercise regimen. And so on.
The case for the network theory of well-being (NT) rests on three
theses. First, positive causal networks exist. Second, well-being can be
understood in terms of positive causal networks. In particular:
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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(NT) A person’s well-being is a function of the strength
of her positive causal networks and of her positive causal
network (PCN) fragments.
And third, the case for NT is that it organizes, unifies and explains a
much wider range of evidence than alternative theories. My goal in
this paper is to provide a very rough sketch of a defense of these three
theses. A full defense would require a much larger canvass.
1. POSITIVE CAUSAL NETWORKS IN PSYCHOLOGY
The idea that positive causal networks exist is neither radical nor orig-
inal. Psychologists have identified many instances of positive causal
networks, though not under that description, and speculated about
their general nature (see, e.g., Lyubomirsky et al. (2005)). The rea-
son this is important, besides giving credit where credit is due, is that
most of the job of arguing for the existence of positive causal networks
has already been done. My task is to merely clarify the posit and argue
that it plays a more significant role in the psychological literature than
some might have thought.
Perhaps the most sustained case for the existence and importance
of positive causal networks is Barbara Fredrickson’s articulation and
defense of the Broaden and Build Hypothesis. According to Fredrick-
son, positive moods and emotions tend to broaden a person’s “thought-
action repertoire, widening the array of the thoughts and actions that
come to mind” (2001, 220). As a result of this broadened thought-
action repertoire, the person is more effectively able to build durable
physical, social, intellectual and psychological resources “that can be
drawn on later in other contexts and in other emotional states” (1998,
307). These resources are durable in the sense that they last much
longer than the emotion. Fredrickson’s Broaden and Build Hypothesis
sets down the following causal schema for a multiply realizable positive
causal chain:
Positive affect→ Broadened thought-action repertoires → Increased
resources.
Add to this the plausible speculation (for which there is quite a bit of
empirical support) that having greater social, psychological, material,
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Figure 2: Fredrickson’s Broaden and Build Cycle
and intellectual resources tends to promote success in ways that foster
positive affect. Now what we have is a general schema of an important
class of positive causal networks.
A person with a high degree of well-being is in a positive rut or
groove—she is enmeshed in a positive causal web involving positive
feelings, attitudes, behaviors, traits and successful interactions with
the world. This view appeals to commonsense: well-being is being in a
“success breeds success” cycle. Of course, it would be just as accurate
and incomplete, though considerably less pithy, to say that well-being
is being in a “positive feeling breeds positive feeling” cycle, or a “pos-
itive attitude breeds positive attitude” cycle, or a “positive trait breeds
positive trait” cycle. With this intuitive understanding of positive causal
networks in hand, let’s focus in more detail on their nature.
2. AN UGLY ACCOUNT OF POSITIVE CAUSAL NETWORKS
Positive causal networks have a commonsense currency. We think that
success breeds success, the rich get richer, and good things tend to hap-
pen to people who are positive and upbeat. There is a natural temp-
tation for philosophers to try to propose a classical account of posi-
tive causal networks: an account framed in terms of singly necessary
and jointly sufficient conditions; an account that uses clear and precise
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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terms; and an account that captures our commonsense, intuitive under-
standing of the posit. Although I would like to offer a beautiful classical
account of positive causal networks, insisting on such an account at this
stage of our investigation is a mistake. We are trying to account for a
scientific posit, not a commonsense one. We must, of course, begin
with our commonsense ideas in trying to make sense of the positive
causal networks. Where else would we begin? But the ultimate goal is
not to capture our commonsense ideas but to improve them. Indeed,
relatively young scientific posits are seldom neatly and accurately char-
acterized. Even when science delivers a classical account of a posit like
water or lightning, it comes after considerable empirical investigation.
Competent investigations into the nature of scientific categories do not
typically begin with great conceptual lucidity. It is a mistake to insist
on greater conceptual clarity than the subject matter currently affords.
I will propose a modest empirical account of positive causal net-
works. Rather than explain a posit in terms of singly necessary and
jointly sufficient conditions, a modest empirical account identifies char-
acteristics that allow us to reliably identify a posit and distinguish it
from other scientific posits. A modest empirical account is explicitly
provisional. It can be effectively used to identify the posit. As we learn
more about it, we can develop more stylish accounts. Positive causal
networks can be identified in terms of three characteristic features.
1. Positive causal networks are made up of an agent’s feelings, emo-
tions, attitudes, behaviors and traits, and interactions with the world.
2. Positive causal networks are homeostatic property clusters: A fam-
ily of properties that tend to co-occur because “[e]ither the presence
of some of the properties... tends to favor the presence of the oth-
ers, or there are underlying mechanisms or processes which tend to
maintain the presence of the” property cluster (Boyd 1989, p. 16).
As with many homeostatic property clusters, positive causal net-
works will have “borderline” cases in which there is no fact of the
matter about whether something is or is not a positive causal net-
work, and they might be without an essence—there is no property
or mechanism that occurs in all instances of the cluster (Boyd 1989,
p. 16–17).
Now let’s consider the question of what makes a causal network—a
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homeostatically clustered set of feelings, emotions, attitudes, behav-
iors, traits, and interactions—a positive causal network.
3. A homeostatically clustered network of feelings, emotions, attitudes,
behaviors, traits, and interactions with the world is positive if it con-
sists of relatively more of the following sorts of states:
a. psychological states that feel good—that have a positive hedonic
tone;
b. states (psychological or not) that when present in this network
tend to bring about psychological states that have a positive hedo-
nic tone;
c. states that the agent values;
d. states that the agent’s culture values.
Causal networks that are positive tend to have relatively more states
that feel good, that lead to states that feel good, or that are valued
by the agent or her culture. Given our current state of knowledge, I
take it that we are not in a position to offer any very informative ac-
count what it is for a psychological state to have a “positive hedonic
tone.” The best we can do is repeat the wisdom of Louis Armstrong,
who, when pressed to define jazz, is reputed to have said, “Man, if you
gotta ask, you’ll never know.” We can, of course, point to stereotypical
examples of experiences with positive hedonic tone, such as the phys-
ical pleasures (e.g., sexual, gastronomic), the feelings involved with
positive social interactions (love, close friendship) and aesthetic expe-
riences (e.g., listening to a symphony, looking at great art). But I will
proceed on the assumption that positive hedonic tone is a basic, unan-
alyzable notion. A call to explain it is a cry for help, not a request for
serious philosophical inquiry.
Positive causal networks can have varying degrees of strength. Some
change, C, to a person’s positive causal networks can strengthen or
weaken those networks. C strengthens a person’s positive causal net-
work if C makes it more robust—it makes the network more able to
persist for a longer time and in a wider range of plausible environ-
ments. C weakens a person’s positive causal network if C makes it less
robust—it makes the network less able to persist for a longer time and
in a wider range of plausible environments. The intuitive idea, here,
is that positive causal networks are homeostatic systems, like living
organisms or running engines. Changes strengthen the system when
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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they make the system tougher, sturdier, more durable, harder to extin-
guish. Changes weaken the system when they make it more delicate,
less durable, easier to extinguish. The factors that alter the strength
(or robustness) of a positive causal network are discoverable only em-
pirically. There is a lot to say on this matter. But for our purposes, I will
leave it at this: In general, there are two ways to strengthen or weaken
a person’s positive causal networks: (i) by changing the intensity of the
states that compose the networks or (ii) by changing the size of those
networks (i.e., by increasing or decreasing the number of states that
make them up). Usually, but not always, an increase in intensity (e.g.,
more happiness, better relationships, more success at work) strength-
ens a positive causal network. And usually, but not always, an increase
in the size of a network (e.g., new friends, newly achieved success at
work) strengthens a positive causal network.
The modest account of positive causal networks I have offered here
will win no beauty contests. Good thing, too. The account merely aims
to mark off one sort of thing from other sorts of thing. My fondest wish
is that it should someday soon be replaced by something far superior.
3. POSITIVE CAUSAL NETWORK FRAGMENTS
Joy’s life is going exceptionally well. She instantiates a very robust set
of positive causal networks. Now consider a series of Joys (Joy’, Joy”,
etc.) each with a missing link: each subsequent Joy is missing one
more link from Joy’s original positive causal networks. Joy’ lacks one
link, Joy” lacks that link and one more, and so on. The lives of any
two contiguous Joys would be going (almost) equally well. Eventually,
there will be intermediate cases such that there is no fact of the matter
about whether these Joys instantiate a positive causal network. Such
borderline cases are to be expected. Then at some further point down
the line, Joy (or rather, Joy”’...) would clearly not instantiate a positive
causal network. But she would still possess fragments of a positive
causal network—states that could be part of a positive causal network.
And intuitively, the presence of these positive causal network fragments
would make Joy’s life better than their absence. To properly account
for well-being, we need to account for these positive causal network
fragments (or PCN fragments).
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The need for PCN fragments arises from the fact that it is possible
for a person to be better or worse off even if he does not instantiate any
positive causal networks. Even if George fails to instantiate any positive
causal networks, his life might go better being entertained by Harold
Lloyd’s Safety Last than ruminating over his latest misery. George en-
joying this great silent movie would be a fragment of a positive causal
network. A state (or set of states) is a fragment of a positive causal
network just in case it is a type of state that could be a significant link
in a positive causal network for that person, keeping relatively con-
stant the sort of person he is (i.e., his personality, his goals and his
general dispositions). Take all the plausible positive causal networks
George might be in. Given his temperament and abilities, for exam-
ple, he might instantiate various networks involving his profession, his
social relationships and his hobbies. The types of states causally impli-
cated in these networks are all PCN fragments for George. The states
that make up these fragments—the pleasant experiences or moods, the
successes, the exercises of talents or skills—they all make life better for
George.
A set of states might be a PCN fragment for one person but not
another. For example, suppose Arthur is a misanthrope, unable to in-
stantiate any positive causal networks involving friendship. It’s not that
he can thrive in close friendships but prefers not to; and it’s not that he
is friendless against his wishes. Rather, Arthur is constitutionally inca-
pable of thriving in relationships with other people. In that case, his
having a friend, by itself, would not be a PCN fragment. Keep in mind
that given Arthur’s misanthropy, his having a friend would not engen-
der in him the typical feelings of camaraderie, solidarity and support it
would in the rest of us. Arthur’s friend might, of course, help him to
act or feel or be in ways that are PCN fragments for Arthur. And so his
friend might make Arthur’s life better indirectly. But the mere fact that
Arthur has a friend does not make his life better. Another less dramatic
example of this sort of phenomenon is that successfully engaging in
some act of mild daredeviltry might be a PCN fragment for Daring Dan
but not for Cautious Charlie.
Fragments of positive causal networks can have varying degrees of
strength. Some change, C, to a person’s PCN fragment can strengthen
or weaken that fragment. What makes for degrees of strength for PCN
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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fragments? This is a tricky matter that deserves more space than I have
here. But in general, a PCN fragment is stronger insofar as it consists of
a greater number of states or those states are more intense (e.g., more
positive affect, more success, etc.). There is one significant qualifica-
tion: A PCN fragment is weakened by any change that makes it more
difficult for the person to instantiate a positive causal network. This
exception is necessary because too much of an otherwise good thing
can sometimes be bad for you. For example, in environments where
one might face genuine risks and dangers, greater degrees of positive
affect, hope and optimism can undermine well-being by engendering
a lack of caution (e.g., engaging in risky behavior, not taking preven-
tative measures). Optimism among older folks “predicts depression in
the wake of stressful events. Perhaps extreme optimism among the el-
derly is unrealistic, and the occurrence of something terrible can dev-
astate the optimistic older individual...” (Peterson & Seligman 2004,
p. 577).
So the network theory of well-being holds that a person’s well-being
is a function of the strength of her positive causal networks and of
her PCN fragments. Other things being equal, a person’s well-being
is promoted with any increase to the strength of her positive causal
networks or fragments thereof; and a person’s well-being is diminished
with any decrease to the strength of her positive causal networks or
fragments thereof. Now let’s turn to the case for NT.
4. WHAT DO WE WANT FROM A THEORY OF WELL-BEING?
What we want from a theory of well-being is straightforward enough:
We want a theory that accurately and perspicuously describes the na-
ture of well-being. But how are we to achieve this goal? What evidence
should we consider? And how should we proceed from that evidence?
The traditional approach to the study of well-being embraces the De-
scriptive Adequacy condition: a successful theory must capture our
commonsense judgments about well-being. James Griffin states that
“the notion we are after is the ordinary notion of ‘well-being”’ (1986,
p. 10). In L.W. Sumner’s discussion of what we want from a theory of
welfare, which he takes to be “more or less the same” as well-being
(1996, p. 1), he concisely articulates the first part of the traditional
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approach:
[T]he best theory about the nature of [well-being] is the
one which is most faithful to our ordinary concept and our
ordinary experience. That experience is given by what we
think or feel or know about well-being, both our own and
that of others. The data which a candidate theory must fit,
therefore, consist of the prodigious variety of our preana-
lytic convictions (1996, p. 10–11).
The best theory of well-being is the one that “makes the best sense of
[our preanalytic] convictions” (1996, p. 11). The degree of fit between
a theory of well-being and our pretheoretic convictions is “a function of
the extent to which the truth conditions [the theory] offers can support
and systematize our intuitive assessments.” While Sumner does not ar-
gue that “descriptive adequacy” is the sole requirement that the correct
theory of well-being must satisfy, it is clearly the most important—it is
“the basic test” (1996, p. 10). Valerie Tiberius also embraces the De-
scriptive Adequacy condition:
Formal analyses [which provide an account of the nature
of well-being] are to be evaluated on the basis of how well
they accommodate our uses of the concept in question and
how well they fit with our ordinary experience. In other
words, formal accounts of well-being are evaluated primar-
ily in terms of their descriptive adequacy. The most de-
scriptively adequate account of well-being is the one that
is most faithful to our pre-philosophical convictions about
well-being (2005, p. 299).
On the traditional approach, the way to evaluate a theory is primar-
ily in terms of whether it is “faithful” to our commonsense judgments
about well-being.
The fundamental problem with the traditional approach is that it is
epistemically over-optimistic. It assumes that our commonsense intu-
itions about the nature of well-being are so epistemically special that it
is reasonable that they should serve as the primary base of evidence for
a theory of well-being. The best way to appreciate the epistemological
immodesty of the traditional approach is in terms of the diversity chal-
lenge: Different people have different commonsense judgments about
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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well-being. It is not clear how the traditional approach is to choose
among them. To make the case for diversity in people’s commonsense
judgments, we do not need to conduct experiments or travel to exotic
locales. There is a robust diversity in commonsense judgments about
well-being among Western philosophers who are experts on the sub-
ject.
The Experience Machine. Consider two people who have ex-
actly the same experiences, but one is genuinely engaged
with the world and the other is prone in a laboratory with a
machine feeding electrical impulses into her brain (Nozick
1974). Do the two people with exactly the same experi-
ences have the same degree of well-being? Some philoso-
phers think they don’t (Nozick 1974) while others, includ-
ing many hedonists, think they do (Crisp 2006).
Remote Desires. We have desires that extend in time and
space far beyond our ken. Examples of remote desires in-
clude the desire for a posthumous good reputation, the de-
sire for a stranger to flourish, the desire for some distant
future scenario (e.g., functional jet packs by the 24th cen-
tury), or some quirky desire whose satisfaction is epistemi-
cally inaccessible (e.g., a prime number of atoms in the uni-
verse) (Parfit 1984; Griffin 1986; Kagan 1998). Does satis-
faction of these remote desires promote our well-being? In-
sofar as these remote desires do not impinge upon our ex-
perience, classical hedonists think their satisfaction cannot
affect well-being. Among desire theorists, there is a range
of opinions. Mark Lukas argues that satisfaction of ev-
ery actual desire, including remote desires, promotes well-
being, although he seems to readily admit that this requires
that one “embrace the absurdity and simply deny the intu-
ition that some desires are irrelevant to well-being” (Lukas
2010, p. 21). Mark Overvold argues that the only desires
whose satisfaction promote a person’s well-being are those
whose satisfaction logically require her existence; and so
the satisfaction of remote desires does not promote well-
being (1982). Other philosophers, however, argue that sat-
isfaction or frustration of posthumous desires can affect a
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person’s well-being (Brandt 1979; Kavka 1986; Portmore
2007). James Griffin distinguishes between informed sat-
isfied desires that can and cannot count towards a person’s
well-being as follows: “What counts for me, therefore, is
what enters my life with no doing from me, what I bring
into my life, and what I do with my life” (1986, p. 22). I
interpret this to mean that as long as a remote informed
desire is properly connected to one’s life plan, its satisfac-
tion promotes the person’s well-being. Griffin’s restriction
rules out some remote desires (e.g., the jet pack or prime
number of atoms desires) but not all of them (e.g., the de-
sire for a posthumous good reputation).
For the traditional approach, these cases are meant to elicit a common-
sense judgment that is supposed to form part of the evidential base
for a theory of well-being. But philosophers’s commonsense judgments
about these cases are incompatible. How are such disagreements to be
resolved? This is a tricky predicament because philosophers are adept
at fitting their commonsense judgments into coherent theories of well-
being. Each philosopher begins with her own idiosyncratic evidential
foundations. And they proceed to build an assortment of clever, inter-
esting and sometimes beautiful theories. But without some principled
way to decide which evidential foundations are the right ones, whose
commonsense judgments are correct, the traditional approach runs the
risk of congealing into a sterile stalemate. Given the current state of
the debate, one can be forgiven for thinking this is something more
than a risk.
I propose an approach to the study of the nature of well-being that
begins with the assumption that well-being is a real state or condi-
tion. It is a condition that scientists can learn about and that laypeo-
ple talk about, perhaps imperfectly, when we talk about well-being.
The assumption that well-being is a real state or condition demands
a certain epistemic modesty about our commonsense judgments about
well-being. On the one hand, our commonsense judgments cannot be
completely off-base. They must track well-being well enough that we
can successfully talk about it. On the other hand, there is no reason
to begin our investigation by supposing that our reflective, pretheo-
retical judgments about well-being are completely coherent and accu-
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rate. As our investigations proceed, of course, we might have reason
to revise our epistemic modesty. Perhaps we will discover that our
commonsense judgments are extremely accurate descriptions of well-
being. Perhaps we will discover that most, but not all, of our common-
sense judgments are reasonably accurate descriptions of well-being. A
rather pessimistic possibility is that no condition in the world answers
very well to our commonsense judgments. In that case, perhaps we
conclude that well-being is a failed posit, like caloric or aether, or per-
haps we conclude that it is a real condition but it is not the sort of
condition that can be empirically studied. A strength of approaching
the study of well-being by assuming that it is a real condition is that
we need not prejudge which of these outcomes is true. Perhaps our
commonsense judgments will turn out to be highly accurate. But per-
haps not. Deep confidence or deep pessimism about our commonsense
well-being judgments should be the result of our investigation into the
nature of well-being, not the starting point of that investigation.
The base of evidence a theory of well-being must account for ex-
tends far beyond the confines of commonsense. A good theory of well-
being will capture at least reasonably well our commonsense judg-
ments about well-being. But because our commonsense judgments
might not be perfectly accurate, this cannot be the only goal of the-
orizing. A theory of well-being should also be able to unify, organize,
and make sense of the science of well-being. While this approach is
unconventional, it does not repudiate the traditional approach. It does
not deny that a theory of well-being should account for our common-
sense judgments. But it asks for significantly more. A theory of well-
being should organize, unify and make sense of positive psychology. A
theory of well-being deserves our allegiance insofar as it does the best
job of accounting for the entirety of the evidence. This philosophical
approach to the study of scientific posits is common in philosophy of
science, particularly philosophy of psychology and mind. For example,
longstanding debates about the existence and nature of belief, emo-
tions and consciousness take as evidence both commonsense lore and
scientific findings (e.g., Stich (1983); Griffiths (1998); Block (2007)).
In Knowledge and its Place in Nature (2002), Hilary Kornblith uses es-
sentially this approach to articulate and defend a theory of knowledge.
Kornblith’s work is an important precedent since he applied this ap-
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proach to knowledge, which, like well-being, is taken to be a normative
category.
5. HOW NT MAKES SENSE OF POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
Most scientific disciplines or subdisciplines can be characterized in ways
that are pithy and specific.
• Cytology is the study of the structure, composition and function
of cells and their parts.
• Kinematics is a branch of mechanics that studies motion (the con-
tinuous change of position).
• Biochemistry is the study of the chemical substances and pro-
cesses that occur in living organisms.
• Cognitive psychology is the study of mental processes such as
perception, memory and reasoning.
These characterizations provide a clear sense of what these disciplines
are about by identifying (putatively) real categories in nature that are
their object of study—cells, motion, chemical substances, living organ-
isms, perception, reasoning. Positive psychology is different. Some
characterizations of positive psychology are pithy and vague, while
others are specific and prolix. But none are like the descriptions of
cytology, kinematics, biochemistry or cognitive psychology—pithy and
specific. Here are some pithy but vague characterizations of positive
psychology.
Positive psychology is the scientific study of what goes right
in life, from birth to death and at all stops in between (Pe-
terson 2006, p. 4).
Positive psychology aims to help people live and flourish
rather than merely to exist (Keyes & Haidt 2003, p. 3).
The label of positive psychology represents those efforts of
professionals to help people optimize human functioning
by acknowledging strengths as well as deficiencies, and
environmental resources in addition to stressors (Wright &
Lopez 2005, p. 42).
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Compared to the characterizations of other scientific disciplines, these
are desperately vague and unclear. Other characterizations of positive
psychology have the opposite problem. They are full of specifics but
are so prolix that they seem to include everything but the kitchen sink.
The field of positive psychology at the subjective level is
about valued subjective experiences: well-being, content-
ment, and satisfaction (in the past); hope and optimism
(for the future); and flow and happiness (in the present).
At the individual level, it is about positive individual traits:
the capacity for love and vocation, courage, interpersonal
skill, aesthetic sensibility, perseverance, forgiveness, origi-
nality, future mindedness, spirituality, high talent, and wis-
dom. At the group level, it is about the civic virtues and
the institutions that move individuals toward better citi-
zenship: responsibility, nurturance, altruism, civility, mod-
eration, tolerance, and work ethic (Seligman & Csikszent-
mihalyi 2000, p. 5).
This list, as long as it is, is not an exhaustive itemization of what posi-
tive psychology investigates. It is a laundry list of “for examples”, not
a coherent description of a scientific discipline. All this suggests a lack
of clarity concerning what positive psychology is really about.
It is noteworthy that all these different characterizations of positive
psychology seem true. This fact can be explained by the hypothesis that
positive psychology is the study of positive causal networks. If positive
psychology is the study of positive causal networks, then it is also the
study of “what goes right in life”, and it does have the capacity to “help
people... flourish" and "optimize human functioning...” And the prolix
characterization is accurate insofar as it touches on the three subjective
elements of positive causal networks: positive feelings and emotions
(contentment, satisfaction, happiness), positive attitudes (hope, opti-
mism), and positive traits (courage, perseverance, originality, altruism,
tolerance, civility). It omits the fourth element of positive causal net-
works, successful interactions with the world. But some above average
success in the world typically accompanies any long stretch of the sub-
jective items cited.
The hypothesis that positive psychology is the study of positive
causal networks makes sense of how practitioners of positive psychol-
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Figure 3: A Positive Causal Network
ogy characterize their field of expertise. It also helps to organize the
large body of research that flies under the banner of positive psychol-
ogy. Consider what positive psychology says about friendship. It is
most natural to represent this visually rather than with the written
word. Most of the items that appear in figure 3 are familiar to com-
monsense, except perhaps for Positive Affect. I take this link to rep-
resent both a relatively stable disposition to have positive experiences
as well as the occurrence of transient positive experiences. While this
amalgam is conceptually unlovely, it helps keep the chart simple.
This chart represents an idealized, incomplete empirical hypothesis.
Take any proposed causal connection posited in the chart. There is
at least some evidence for that connection, but there are reasonable
complaints one might raise - one might object to how the states were
measured, to the experimental arrangements, to whether there is good
evidence for causal connections among the states rather than mere cor-
relations, etc. But my contention is that there is enough evidence to
suppose that something like this causal network exists even if some of
its pieces should not survive further investigation. The chart is also rad-
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ically incomplete. The arrows typically represent indirect causal con-
nections that can be mediated in many different ways. For example,
the “Success with Projects→ Positive Affect” chain is well-established.
But one would be right to point out that it is typically perceived success
rather than actual success that is causally relevant to positive affect.
Success that is not perceived as success won’t lead to positive affect;
and lack of success that is perceived as success can lead to positive
affect. So the chart should perhaps include the intervening link.
Success→ Perceived Success→ Positive Affect
But neither of those chains is direct or unmediated. The “Perceived
Success → Positive Affect” chain does not always obtain - depressive
episodes often survive perceived successes, after all. Besides including
incomplete oversimplifications, this chart does not aim to represent any
real positive causal networks, which are messy and complicated. It is
best understood as an idealized and incomplete instance of a positive
causal network.
The visual representation of this positive causal network makes
clear that it is, in fact, a network, involving links bound together
with many causal connections. The network consists of many positive
cycles—connections that loop back onto the same types of states. Be-
gin at any node and a sequence of causal connections will take you to
any other node. As a result—and this can be lost in any linear, written
description—there is no compulsory starting point. There is no state we
must privilege as the most important in the network. Mind you, there
might be some states that are of particular importance to this network.
But these questions go to the heart of positive psychology as the study
of the dynamics of positive causal networks rather than their structure.
Dynamical questions concern what factors scuttle, inhibit, maintain,
promote or establish positive causal networks. For example, there may
be some link that is typically or practically necessary for the above
friendship network to remain in operation. If that link is weakened or
removed, the entire network is crippled or destroyed. Just by looking
at the chart, it seems as though Positive Affect is a good candidate for
such a state. But this node covers a wide range of states, some might
be important, others not. Furthermore, the chart is incomplete. For all
we know, there might be a set of nodes not included in this chart that
would keep a (somewhat modified) version of this network going even
Vol. 7: Morality and the Cognitive Sciences
19 Michael Bishop
if positive affect were largely absent. There may also be some link that
is typically or practically sufficient to establish or maintain this network
in operation. In reasonably favorable circumstances, it might be that
the presence of some link will kick start the friendship network. Com-
monsense suggests that in reasonably propitious environments, Others
Judging One More Positively together with Extraversion might be suffi-
cient to start this process, whereas Positive Affect by itself isn’t. And it
is natural to wonder whether some link in the friendship network is
more important than others in one of these ways: Is some link usually
or practically necessary for the operation of the entire network? Does
some link or set of links, in friendly environments, typically establish
such a network? These are good questions, questions naturally raised
by thinking about positive psychology as the study of the dynamics of
positive causal networks. But they are empirical questions to be settled
by competent empirical research.
Let’s focus on some of the parts of the friendship network. When
positive affect is induced in the laboratory, studies suggest that it will
tend to make you more sociable and friendly (3 → 1). For example,
you are more likely to start a conversation with a stranger (Isen 1970).
And in that conversation, you are more likely to offer intimate self-
disclosures (Cunningham 1988). What’s more, you will be more gener-
ous and positive in your judgments and interpretations of other people.
For example, after conducting a simulated job interview, positive affect
subjects rate interviewees more highly and are more likely to “hire”
them (Baron 1987). So people who are in a good mood and feeling
happy will tend to be friendlier, more open and more generous toward
other people. But this is in the laboratory. What about in the real
world? People high in positive affect tend to judge their interactions
with others to be more pleasant and enjoyable than people low in pos-
itive affect. For example, happier people are more likely to express a
desire to be friends with or work on a project with a new acquaintance,
and they are more likely to judge the person to be “kind, self-assured,
open, tolerant, warm” (Lyubomirsky & Tucker 1998, p. 179).
The good vibes happy people send out to others are reciprocated
in spades (3 → 6). People high in self-reported positive affect are
more favorably judged by the people they interact with as well as by
third parties who view videotapes of their interactions (Berry & Hansen
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1996, p. 800). A review of the literature reports that happy peo-
ple are judged to be better looking, more competent and intelligent,
friendlier and more assertive, more moral “and even more likely to go
to heaven.” The friends and family of happier people judge them to be
more “socially skilled (e.g., more articulate and well mannered), bet-
ter public speakers, self-confident, and assertive, and as having more
close friends, a strong romantic relationship, and more family support”
((Lyubomirsky, King & Diener 2005, p.827), see text for citations).
Our discussion of friendship has focused considerably on positive
affect. But to emphasize the point made above that positive causal
networks have no a priori compulsory starting points, we could have
started our discussion with the personality trait extraversion. In a lon-
gitudinal study, Costa and McCrae found that extraversion (e.g., so-
ciability, vigor, social involvement) predicts positive affect and life sat-
isfaction 10 years later (1980, p. 675) (1b → 3). In a meta-analysis,
DeNeve & Cooper (1998)) argue that the extraversion-happiness corre-
lation is quite strong; in fact, they argue for the existence of a positive
cycle involving positive affect, friendly personality traits, and success-
ful relationships.
Positive affect is not tied solely to Extraversion. Rather,
positive affect stems primarily from our connections with
others, both in terms of the quantity of relationships (Ex-
traversion) as well as the quality of relationships (Agree-
ableness)... [R]elationship type personality traits foster
better relationships. However, they appear to provide an-
other bonus to the holder; they also facilitate the experi-
ence of positive affect... (220-221).
At the risk of beating a long dead horse, I am not imposing positive
causal networks on the psychology from the armchair. It’s right there.
Costa and McCrae argue that positive affect brings about extraver-
sion, which brings about more and stronger relationships, which brings
about positive affect... And so on.
6. NT AND COMMONSENSE
The case for NT relies on arguing that NT does about as well as com-
petitors at capturing our commonsense well-being judgments and it is
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far superior at making sense of positive psychology. To show that NT
captures commonsense reasonably well, my plan is to argue that NT
can explain both what is intuitively right and intuitively wrong with
a pair of well-known theories of well-being, hedonism and informed
desire theory (IDT). It is important to keep in mind the logic of the
case for NT. The objections to hedonism and IDT I will consider will be
very familiar to proponents of those theories. And defenders of these
theories will have smart things to say about these objections. But this
is irrelevant. The case for NT is not that it captures the intuitions of
the proponent of IDT better than IDT. It doesn’t. NT does not capture
the hedonist’s intuitions better than hedonism, and it does not capture
the Aristotelian’s intuitions better than Aristotle’s theory. In fact, NT
doesn’t even capture my own commonsense judgments perfectly. The
right conclusion to draw from all this is that arguing for a view of well-
being on the grounds of commonsense is a recipe for dissensus and
deadlock. If I get to judge your theory in terms of whether it captures
my intuitions, then in the face of my settled insistence that my theory
does a better job than your theory at capturing my intuitions, you don’t
have much more to say. We are at an impasse. But if the main goal of
your theory is to capture a wide range of evidence of which my com-
monsense judgments are but a small part, then in the face of my firm
insistence that your theory doesn’t capture my intuitions, you have a
straightforward and compelling reply. You can rationally defeat my re-
sistance by pointing to the fallibility of commonsense judgment and to
the far greater explanatory power of your theory. Of course, I might in-
sist upon the epistemic sublimity of my commonsense judgments and
refuse to budge. But that would be my problem, not yours.
6.1. Hedonism
Hedonism is the thesis that well-being is a function of the balance of
positively valenced experience (e.g., enjoyment, pleasure, happiness)
over negatively valenced experience (e.g., suffering, pain). It is the
thesis that “what is good for any individual is the enjoyable experience
in her life, what is bad is the suffering in that life, and the life best
for an individual is that with the greatest balance of enjoyment over
suffering” (Crisp 2006, p. 622). Hedonism is an explanatory theory.
It explains why close relationships or professional success contribute
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to a person’s well-being. What makes those things good for a person,
the reason they contribute to her well-being, is that they bring about a
robustly favorable hedonic balance of enjoyment over suffering.
NT accounts for the intuitive power of hedonism. If NT is true,
hedonism is approximately true. Positive causal networks consist of
states with a robustly favorable hedonic balance of enjoyment over
suffering. And so according to NT, people with more well-being tend
to have more (net) positive experiences. Hedonism and NT will yield
a considerable amount of overlap in their particular judgments about
people’s well-being. They diverge in their explanatory ambitions. Sup-
pose Susan begins some sort of treatment regimen that bolsters her
well-being. The hedonist explains this in terms of the overall improve-
ment in the hedonic tone of Susan’s subjective experiences. She now
has more net pleasure than she did before. But for NT, the treatment
regime brings about a significant increase in Susan’s well-being because
it makes more robust her positive causal networks. It might change the
intensity of certain parts of her positive causal networks. For exam-
ple, she is a bit less industrious, which permits her to appreciate other
successful aspects of her life, or she is a bit more patient with family
and friends, which strengthens her close relationships. Or perhaps the
treatment regimen adds new elements to her positive causal networks.
For example, she is now more at peace with her place in life and more
optimistic about the future which leads her to form new friendships
and rekindle old ones. These changes make Susan’s positive causal net-
works more robust—they are more resilient to life’s occasional knocks.
For NT, the reason Susan’s treatment regime increases her well-being
is that it brings about stable changes to her life. It bolsters the robust-
ness of the positive causal networks that make up her well-being. The
hedonic zing is part of the story, and a crucial part of most stories, but
it is only a part. NT unearths and makes explicit the causal structure
and the dynamics of well-being, and it explains well-being in terms of
factors that are causally implicated in its perpetuation. From the per-
spective of NT, the explanations offered by the hedonist for why some
aspect of Susan’s life contributes to her well-being are usually only par-
tially true—on the right track but incomplete.
Some will object that I have unfairly saddled hedonism with a
short-sightedness that is contrary to the view. Suppose the short-term
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hedonic zing of Susan’s treatment regime brings about dispositions of
behavior or of mind that lead to further pleasant experiences. The
hedonist would rightly insist on counting these longer-term hedonic
consequences of the treatment regime as part of the explanation for its
effects on Susan’s well-being. This is a fair point. But from the perspec-
tive of NT, the problem with the hedonist’s explanation is not that it is
short-sighted. It is that the explanation, no matter how far sighted, is
inevitably partial. It ignores the causal structure, stability and dynamics
of well-being because it focuses exclusively on one part of that structure.
The hedonic tone of a person’s life is typically a good indicator of the
strength of the positive networks that make up her well-being. In fact,
it might be the best single indicator there is. And so hedonism is a
reasonable approximation of the truth about the nature of well-being.
But it is not the whole truth.
To appreciate how well NT conforms to our everyday intuitions
about well-being, let’s consider a standard objection many philoso-
phers take to be a serious problem for hedonism. This objection targets
any mental state view of well-being, any view that takes a person’s
well-being to be entirely a function of her mental states. It relies on
Nozick’s experience machine thought experiment.
Suppose there were an experience machine that would give
you any experience you desired. Superduper neuropsy-
chologists could stimulate your brain so that you would
think and feel you were writing a great novel, or making
a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time you
would be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to
your brain... Would you plug in? (Nozick 1974, p. 42–43).
We can sharpen the example by supposing that Richard and Anthony
have exactly the same positive experiences, mostly positive, except that
Richard is hooked up to the experience machine while Anthony is gen-
uinely engaged with the world. Hedonism, like any mental state theory
of well-being, implies that the experience machine doesn’t matter to a
person’s level of well-being. As long as they’re having exactly the same
experiences and exactly the same mental states, hedonism yields the
result that Richard and Anthony have exactly the same levels of well-
being. And the conventional wisdom among philosophers is that this
is wrong. Anthony has a higher level of well-being than Richard. My
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argument here is not that hedonism is false because it fails to accord
with many philosophers’s intuitions. Instead, the experience machine
objection is relevant because what philosophers have said and thought
about well-being is part of the evidence a theory of well-being should
explain. And in his defense of hedonism, Roger Crisp describes the
current conventional philosophical wisdom:
Hedonism has a distinguished philosophical history.... In
the twentieth century, however, hedonism became signifi-
cantly less popular... [W]hile hedonism was down, Robert
Nozick dealt it a near-fatal blow with his famous example
of the experience machine. The result has been that these
days hedonism receives little philosophical attention, and
students are warned off it early on in their studies, often
with a reference to Nozick (2006, p. 619–20).
This is roughly what we would expect if NT were true and philosophers
over time have been getting closer to the truth about the nature of well-
being. While there is much more to say on this topic, my provisional
conclusion is that compared to hedonism, NT does reasonably well at
capturing people’s commonsense well-being judgments.
6.2. Informed Desire Theory
The basic idea behind desire theories is that a person is better off in-
sofar as she gets what she wants. More carefully, IDT holds that a
person’s well-being is a function of the satisfaction of her informed de-
sires. A desire is satisfied (or fulfilled) when the content of the desire
comes about. So a person’s well-being is a function of whether certain
states in the world obtain, and in many cases those states are not sub-
jective mental states. For example, when I desire that my child learn to
swim, what satisfies that desire is not that I believe that he has learned
to swim or that he or I enjoy his learning to swim. What satisfies my
desire is that my child actually learns to swim. If this is one of my
informed desires and it is satisfied, then according to a standard ver-
sion of IDT this increases my well-being. But not all desires are created
equal. My satisfied desire that my children be healthy increases my
well-being significantly more than my satisfied desire that my favorite
sports team wins this weekend. James Griffin argues that the strength
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of a desire is not a matter of intensity or motivational force. At some
time, the desire one has with the strongest motivational force might be
to smoke or overeat, even though satisfaction of those desires might not
increase one’s well-being. “If strength [of desire] were interpreted as
motivational force, then ’utility’ would lose its links with well-being...
So to retain the links with well-being, the relevant sense of ‘strength’
has to be, not motivational force, but rank in a cool preference order-
ing, an ordering that reflects appreciation of the nature of the objects
of desire” (Griffin 1986, p. 15).
A significant challenge for any IDT is to explain what it is for a de-
sire to be informed. The motivation for this caveat is clear: Some of
our actual desires can be based on ignorance or misinformation. For
example, the satisfaction of my desire to eat the delicious looking ba-
nana split or to take the euphoria-inducing drug might not increase my
well-being at all, and in fact might undermine it, because the banana
split is tainted and because the drug leads to addiction and ruin. Had I
been appropriately informed about these matters, and had I used that
information in a rational way, that desire would not have survived.
But what is it for a desire to be appropriately informed? I think the
best answer is given by Peter Railton. He accounts for an individual’s
“objectified subjective interest” as follows.
Give to an actual individual A unqualified cognitive and
imaginative powers, and full factual and nomological in-
formation about his physical and psychological constitu-
tion, capacities, circumstances, history, and so on. A will
have become A+, who has complete and vivid knowledge
of himself and his environment, and whose instrumental
rationality is in no way defective. We now ask A+ to tell us
not what he currently wants, but what he would want his
nonidealized self A to want—or, more generally, to seek—
were he to find himself in the actual condition and circum-
stances of A... [W]e may assume there to be a reduction
basis for his objectified subjective interests, namely, those
facts about A and his circumstances that A+ would com-
bine with his general knowledge in arriving at his views
about what he would want to want were he to step into A’s
shoes (2003, p. 11).
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So my informed desires are those desires my idealized self would want
me (the non-idealized me) to want were he to be in my shoes.
NT can capture what is intuitively plausible about IDT. If NT is true,
then the IDT is approximately true, although strictly false. Satisfying a
person’s informed desires will typically help to promote the robustness
of her positive networks. This isn’t an accident. If we focus on peo-
ple’s actual desires, healthy people with a modicum of insight about
themselves and how the world works tend to have a host of desires
that, if satisfied, would promote the robustness of their positive causal
networks. In general, most of us want our relationships to be strong,
we want our families to prosper, we want to be good to our friends and
we want our friends to be good to us, we want to be happy, healthy,
safe and productive. These very general desires will engender particu-
lar desires that will vary widely given different people’s situations, e.g.,
you want to land that job, and I want to retire early. The overlap be-
tween NT and desire theory is even greater when we restrict ourselves
to informed desires—i.e., the desires your idealized self would want
for your real self if your idealized self were in your shoes. When a
person’s particular desires are well-informed—when, for example, re-
tiring early really will have the positive consequences on my life that
I think it will—the satisfaction of these desires will tend to strengthen
the positive networks that make up a person’s well-being. So NT can
explain what’s intuitively right about IDT.
The most basic objection to IDT is that the connection between in-
formed desires and well-being is a contingent one. Some satisfied de-
sires do nothing for well-being, while others can positively undermine
well-being. Remote desires (desires whose satisfaction makes no dif-
ference to our experience) are one class of desires that prima facie do
nothing for a person’s well-being. Eric’s desire for posthumous recogni-
tion (e.g., fame or something more modest, like a fancy carving on his
tombstone) might survive full information. But would the satisfaction
or non-satisfaction of such posthumous desires affect his well-being?
Desires whose satisfaction are epistemically inaccessible and that do
not touch on Eric’s life (e.g., he desires that there be a prime number
of atoms in the universe) seem to be irrelevant to well-being (Parfit
1984; Griffin 1986; Kagan 1998). Rawls gives an example of a person
who wants to count the blades of grass on the college green (1971,
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p. 432). It seems possible for the satisfaction of this desire to actually
undermine well-being. Most philosophers take at least some of these
implications to be contrary to commonsense. As a result, proponents of
IDT often adopt various embellishments to avoid at least some of these
implications.
NT takes these objections to IDT to be largely correct. Take any
desire Eric might have—no matter how strong or well-informed that
desire might be. It is always an open empirical question how the satis-
faction of that desire will affect the positive causal processes that con-
stitute Eric’s well-being. The satisfaction of posthumous desires or epis-
temically inaccessible desires will do nothing for the robustness of his
positive causal networks. And so the objection that satisfaction of cer-
tain remote desires is irrelevant to a person’s well-being is true. What’s
more, it is possible that the satisfaction of an informed desire might
undermine the robustness of a person’s positive causal networks. The
grass counter might spend his time on a project that brings nothing but
physical discomfort, grief and derision. If the satisfaction of that desire
undermines the smooth operation of the positive causal networks that
make up Eric’s well-being, then according to NT it would undermine
his well-being.
There is much more to say about NT and commonsense. But this
is enough to at least make it plausible to suppose that NT does an
adequate job capturing our commonsense judgments about well-being.
For now, that is enough.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper offers an approach to the philosophical investigation into
well-being that begins with the assumption that well-being is a con-
dition that can be empirically studied. The approach is novel insofar
as it has never (as far as I am aware) been applied to the study of
well-being. But it is by no means novel to philosophers. It rests on
very standard and familiar philosophical views about kinds and how
we learn about them, and it has been used by many philosophers to
investigate philosophically interesting subjects.
On the assumption that well-being is a real condition, no theory
about its nature can win the day simply by providing a coherent ac-
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count of someone’s commonsense judgments about well-being. Given
the diversity of such judgments, commonsense by itself is simply not
epistemically sturdy enough to adjudicate between competing theories.
And so the case for NT is built on a simple strategy: Battle to a draw
on the commonsense evidence and win on the scientific evidence. NT
is not so contrary to commonsense that it deserves to be forsaken. And
it does exceptionally well at unifying and making sense of the scientific
evidence. In order for another theory to defeat NT, it is not enough to
show that it captures someone’s commonsense judgments better than
NT. One must show that it captures the entirety of the evidence better
than NT.1
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